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I.

Introduction
The U.S. legal profession is interesting from an organizational perspective

because of the variety of coexisting alternatives, ranging from sole practitioners
to large corporations, and including relatively large partnerships, an organizational
form often considered to be unwieldy and inefficient.

One characteristic which the

majority of law firms have in common is the necessity of choosing a mechanism to
determine the distribution of income shares among the partners or owners. The
sharing of net income among the members of the enterprise is also a characteristic
of producer cooperatives; hence, producer cooperative theory can be used to analyze
certain economic characteristics of law firms.

The analysis which follows provides

a framework within which these characteristics of alternative legal organizations
are

id~ntified

and

compared~,

Four organizational models are considered:

"simple"

firms, "col'!lT1unal" partnerships, "collective" partnerships, and "collective hiring"
partnerships. A simple firm is a sole practitioner or a general partnership in
which each partner takes as income his own receipts minus a contribution to partnership overhead costs.

A communal partnership is a firm in which the partners or

owners share equally in the net income. A collective partnership is a firm in which
the partner's or owner's share in net income is proportional to his "contribution"
or "effort," however measured.

A collective hiring partnership differs from a

collective partnership only in the fact that it hires non-partner associates or
paralegals at relatively low salaries or wages.
Economic characteristics analyzed and compared include optimal employment
and/or partnership size, economic efficiency, individual work incentives, and the
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impact on partner or employee work effort of changes in others' work decisions,
scale of operation, product price, wage rate, taxes, and rent.
II.

Labor Utilization
Differences in labor utilization between competitive capitalist firms and

producer cooperatives are well-known, and can applied directly to the comparison
of optimal short-run and long-run labor use among simple firms, communal partnerships, and collective partnerships in the legal profession.

Collective hiring

partnerships, however, differ from traditional producer cooperatives in that they
hire non-partner labor at relatively low wages.

The impact of this difference on

aggregate labor use and partnership size in collective hiring partnerships in
contrast to other law firms can be identified by the method of analysis found in
Israelsen [1980a, 1980b].

In this analysis it is assumed that the number of hired

employees (and aggregate labor) in the collective hiring partnership can be adjusted
in the short run, but that partnership size (number of partners) can be adjusted
only in the long run.

It is also assumed that the number of hired employees (and

aggregate labor) is always at the optimal level in the long run.

Simple firms

behave like ordinary capitalist profit maximizers, and communal and collective
partnerships can attain optimal size in the long run, but not necessarily in the
short run.

Optimal values are determined below for collective hiring partnerships,
)

then compared to values determined for alternative organizations.
Optimal Hiring and Aggregate Labor
List of Symbols
L

total amount of labor (number of partners plus number of employees)

Ll

number of partners

L2 = L - Ll
F(L)

number of hired employees

production function

3

p

product price

w

wage rate or salary rate for hired employees

D

income to partners (lldividend rate

tl

tax rate on value of output

t2

tax rate on net partnership income

R

rental or other fixed costs

*

denotes optimal values

ll

)

Assumptions
1.

Labor quality and hours worked are homogeneous across all workers
(partners and hired employees).

2.

Hired employees (associates and/or paralegals) is the only short run
variable input.

Physical facilities and capital are fixed in quantity

and quality and are owned by the partnership.

Initially, no rental or

other fixed charge is paid to an outside entity ..
3.

The

par~nership

is a price-taker in product and labor markets; therefore,

prices and wages are parametric.
4.

The production function is "well-behaved."

5.

There is complete certainty.
Short-run optimization.

We assume that the objective ot the partnership

is the maximization of net income per partner--the dividend rate--defined as

(2 1) 0 - pF(L) - wL 2 _ pF(L) - w(L - L1) _ pF(l) - wl
•

-

L1

-

[1

-

+

[1

'I .

Since Ll is fixed in the short run, D can be maximized with respect to
l2' or equivalently, with respect to L.
r~pect

Differentiating (2.1) with

to L, we obtain the first-or-der condition

(2.2) ~

= i-fPF'(L) - w] = 0,
1
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or
(2.2a)

pF'(l)

= w.

Equation (2.2a), of course, is the familiar VMP l = w condition for profit maximization in a competitive capitalist firm. We conclude, then, that short-run
optimal aggregate labor utilization in a collective hiring partnership is
identical to that of an equivalent capitalist firm.
long-run optimization.

Since the first-order condition for optimal aggregate

labor use (2.2a) is independent of partnership size (ll)' it will also be applicable
in the long run, when membership size can be adjusted.

It can be concluded, then,

that the collective hiring partnership exhibits aggregate labor-use behavior
identical to that of an equivalent ordinary competitive capitalist firm both in
the short run and the long run.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between the

dividend rate (D) and aggregate labor utilization (l) for various given partnership
sizes (ll).

The subscripts on the dividend curves correspond to the subscripts for

the various given partnership sizes.

Note that the dividend-maximizing aggregate

labor level (l*) is independent of the level of ll' although the size of the
dividend is not.

It can be shown that for any given value of ll' the dividend

curve and the VAP curve coincide at the point II = l. Also, it can be demonstrated
l
that the dividend curve is above, below, or equal to the VAP l curve when the value
of the average product is, respectively, greater than, less than, or equal to the
wage rate.
Changes in parameters.

From (2.2a) it is clear that an increase in

p would cause the optimal level of labor to increase, i.e., ~~* > o.
It is also apparent that al*
dW < O. If a percentage tax (t l ) on gross
output value \"lere introduced, (2.2a) would become
(2.2a ' ) (l - tvPF'{l) = w,
al* would be negative. A tax (t ) on net profits would leave (2.2a)
and ~
2
1
aL*
unchanged, as would a fixed charge (R) on the partnership. Thus at:
and ~~* are both zero.

2

In each of these cases, the response of the
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o

w~----~--------------------~~----~~----

I

l'
VAP L

J

1
L

Figure 1.

0 as a function of L for various values of L,.
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hiring partnership to a change in the indicated parameter is indistinguishable
from that of an ordinary profit-maximizing capitalist enterprise.
Optimal Partnership Size
Because of its very nature, a partnership does not vary the number of
partners as easily as an ordinary capitalist firm can vary the number of employees.
However, we assume that the optimal (dividend-maximizing) partnership size can be
attained in the long run.
can be deduced from (2.1).

For the hiring partnership, optimal partnership size
It is clear by inspection that dividend maximization

requires membership minimization if pF(L*) - wL* is positive, i.e., if VAP L* i$
greater than w. This obs€rvation is verified by noting that

(2.3) ~ = - ~PF(L*) - wl*]
L1

L1

= - ~ -~F (L*)

- w

< 0

if VAP L* > w.

Ll
Since paralegals and associates in law partnerships typically are paid wages and
salaries considerably below the income of partners, we conclude that the optimal
hiring partnership would consist of one member, given the assumptions of our model.
That this is not the case in practice does not necessarily mean that law partnerships which hire employees are too large.

One of the assumptions of the model,

that all labor is homogeneous, is obviously not the case in typical law partnerships.
Hired employees are not perfect sUbstitutes for partner labor, and partners are
not perfect substitutes for each other.

The gains in productivity that come from

specialization may account for the large size of many law partnerships.

In addition,

there may be complementarity between these special ized factors of production. -.Economies of scale and other effects may also help account for the large size of these
partnerships.

Nevertheless, the pressure to reduce partnership size in order to

increase partner income, ceteris paribus, is a characteristic of this organizational
model. With the assumptions of this section, the sole practitioner who hires

7
paralegals is the optimal "hiring partnership."

Figure 2

sh~~s

the relationship between the dividend rate (0) and

membership size (L l ) for various given values of L. Subscripts on the
dividend curves correspond to subscripts for the levels of l. Note that
the dividend rate is a decreasing function of Ll for all values of L
which imply VAP L > w. As was demonstrated in figure 1, dividend and
value of average product curves coincide when Ll = l. It is clear from
both fi gures that L* f11aximi zes 0 for any val ue of ll.
If, by chance, the optimal hiring point (VMP l = w) implies VAP l * < W,
~r will be positive, and dividend maximization requires L1 = L. Whereas
1

neither an ordinary capitalist firm nor the law partnership would hire any
labor in this circumstance; rather than shutting down in the long run, as
would the capitalist firm, the partnership would maximize the dividend rate
by adding partners to the VMP l = VAP L point. This result can be seen from
equation (2.1). If L is replaced by Ll , the dividen.d rate becomes
{2.4}

0

=

pF(L 1) - (L 1 - L1)w

Differentiating (4) with

II .

r~pect

F(L 1)

=P

[1

to Ll yields the first-order condition

'
(2 5) dO - L1PF (ll) ·- ·pF(L 1) 1
· 0i1 L~
= 11

pF'(L) - J-oF(L )
1
L 1'

= 0,

or

which is the familiar optimum condition for producer cooperative membership size-which would be the optimum partnership size condition in our communal and
collective partnerships (without hiring).

If the value of average product

is equal to the wage or salary rate at the optimal aggregate labor level,
dD
o = w = VAP l * for any value of' l l s L*, and dl
= O. In this case,
1

8

D

w~----~----------------------~~--~-----

Figure 2.

D as a function of Ll for various values of L.

L, s L
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optimal partnership size is indeterminate.

Note, in this connection, that

in figure 2 the dividend curves for (l)O and (l)S coincide with the wage
rate.

Also, for values Qf l which correspond to VAP l less than w, such as
(l)6 in figure 2, the dividend rate is below the wage rate and is an increasing

function of L . For ~on-hiring partnerships, optimal size . is (L)3 in ~ ~~gure .2;
l
Changes in parameters. Optimal partnership size in the normal case
l * > w) is unaffected by changes in product price or wage rate.
Only if increases in the wage rate and/or decreases in the product price
(VAP

are sufficient to cause the maximum value of average product of labor to
be less than the wage will the optimal size of the partnership be greater
than one partner. The impact of changes in other parameters on the optimal
size of the partnership can be found by differentiating the general form of
the partnership dividend,
(1 - t 2 )

(2.6) 0 =

l

[(1 - t 1)pF(L) - w(l - L1) - R]

1

(1 - t 2 )
[(1 , - t 1)pF(l) - wl - R] + w(l - t 2),
= l
1

with respect to L1 , obtaining
(2.7) dO
~ll

=-

--

(1 - t 2)

2
Ll

l(l - t 2)

L2

1

[(1 - t 1)pF(L) - wL - R]
-(1

-

~ . tl)pF(L)

L

- R
- w

It is clear from (2.7) that the optimal size of the hiring partnership remains
at one partner for all changes in t l , p, R, and w which do not cause the
. (1 - tl)pF(l) - R
net value of average product of labor,
L
' to be less
than the wage rate.

It;s also clear that the tax on net income (t 2)

will not affect the optimal partnership size as long as the tax rate is less
than 100 percent.
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Comparison with Non-hiring Partnerships and Capitalist Models
Conditions for optimal partnership size and/or aggregate labor utilization
for non-hiring partnerships (communal and collective partnerships) and a competitive capitalist firm are summarized in table 1.

Table 2 compares the impact

of changes in prices, wages, rent, and tax rates on labor utilization and/or
partnership size.

In both tables, it is assumed that the net value of average

product curve for labor has a maximum greater than the wage rate at a positive
level of labor, and that the enterprise produces one product only.

In table 1,

the optimality conditions shown are for the most general case, where rent,
income tax, and output tax are all imposed.

In the absence of a tax on the gross

value of output, NVMP L and NVMP L would be replaced by VMP L and VMP L, and in the
1
1
absence of rent, NVAP L would be replaced by VAP L .
1

1

The model used for non-hiring partnerships in tables 1 and 2 is the same
as the one used by

\~ard

[1958], and labeled by Domar [1966] as the "pure" model

of a producer cooperative.

In this model, as in the hiring partnership model, labor

contributi.eD by members 1.s ··fixed, but number of partners is variable, and it
is assumed that the partnership can achieve optimal size in the long run.

We

will analyze the situation of variable labor effort or "contribution" to the
partnership in section III, in connection with incentives.
The slmilarities in labor-use behavior between the prototype hiring partnership ' and the competitive capitalist model and the differences in optimal partnership size between the hiring and non-hiring partnerships are equally striking.
In terms of labor use the hiring partnership behaves exactly like a capitalist,
and in terms of number of partners, the optimal hiring partnership size is 1.
It should be noted, however, that rent plays a key role in the "perverse" employment and output response of the non-hiring partnership to changes in product
price.

With no rent, the optimal partnership size is independent of product price.
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TABLE 1
Conditions Determining Optimal ~embership Size (L,)
and/or Aggregate Labor Utilization (L)
in Alternative Economic Oranizations
Nodel

Condition
for
Non-hiring
Partnersnip.
Partnership
Size
NVHP L

1

Aggregate
Labor

Hiring ·
Partnership

Competitive
Capital ist

minimize Ll
(L 1 = 1)

-

NVf\1P L = w

NV~1PL

= NVAP L

1

=w
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TABLE 2
The Effects of Changes in Prices, Wages, Rent, and Tax Rates
on Opt; rna 1 !~embershi p S; ze and/or Aggregate Labor
Utilization in Alternative Economic Organizations
t~odel

Nature of
Change

Non-hiring
.par.tnership

Hirinq
. Partnershi p.

Competitive
Capitalist

Effect on .. partnership size Effect on labor utilization
Increase in p
Increase in w
Increase in R

+

Increase in tl

+

Increase in t2

o

o
o
o
o
o

+

+

o

o

o

o
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Also, if the nonhiring partnership's VAP L curve is everywhere decreasing with
1
respect to labor and there is no rent, it behaves like the hiring partnership,
maximizing the dividend by minimizing the number of partners.

In the hiring

partnership model, the results shown tn the tables are independent of the presence
of rent.
In summary, the perverse responses to changes in product price and rent,
and the inefficient allocation of labor within and among partnerships which characterizes the non-hiring partnership model are entirely absent in the hiring
model, if competitive labor markets and no tax on output are assumed.
then, that the hiring partnership system is economically efficient.

We conclude,
The effects

of variable labor effort on partnership efficiency will be examined in the section
which follows.
III.

Individual Work Incentives
The conclusions of the previous section were based on two critical assumptions:

variable partnership size, and fixed labor contribution by each employee or partner.
In

the~hort

run, variable partnership size is an unrealistic assumption. On the

other hand., ' while the partnership may set a nonn for partner work effort (libillable
hours,1I .. for example), partners are free to contribute as much effort as they choose.
The number of hours a partner may choose to contribute depends upon, among other
•

J

things, the expected increase in income and, therefore, in utility which accrues
to the partner as a result of his extra work.

In other words, the "marginal

income" a partner can expect in return for marginal increments in his labor contribution is a critical factor in influencing his labor-leisure decision.

It is upon

this concept of "marginal income"--which we adopt as a measure of individual work
incentive--that the following analysis is based.

The model developed in this

section follows the technique used by Israelsen [198Ca]to compare individual work
incentives in collectives, communes, and capitalist enterprises.

The results

shown below for communal and collective partnerships are taken from that study.
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Development of the Model
Although many systems are used by law firms to determine the share of net income
accruing to each partner or owner; except in the case of simple firms, the systems
can be grouped into those in which the share of a partner does not depend on
his relative work effort, and those in which the share of a partner does depend
on his relative work effort, however that effort is measured. We refer to the
first type as a communal partnership, and the second as a collective partnership.
Casual empiricism suggests that few large partnerships are communal, so we do
not analyze communal partnerships with hiring, though the analysis presents no
problems. As Israe1sen [1980a]demonstrated, work incentives in collectives are
in general much higher than in communes, other things equal.
As was shown in section II, the hiring of non-par.tner labor causes the
prototype hiring partnership to behave exactly like a profit-maximizing capitalist
enterprise in its decisions regarding aggregate labor use.

The hiring of non-

partner labor also plays a role in the individual incentive model--that of
differentiating work incenttves for members of collective hiring partnerships
from those facing partners in non-hiring collective partnerships.
developed below compares work incentives for three groups:
hiring partnerships,
in

non-hirin~

The model

partners in collective

employees of collective hiring partnerships, and partners

collective partnerships.

Reference will also be made to simple

finm work incentives and incentives for partners in communal partnerships.
The model consists of two law finms:

a prototype collective hiring partner-

ship and a prototype collective non-hiring partnership.
Assumptions:
1.

Identical "well-behaved" production functions.

2.

Labor is the only variable input. The number of partners is fixed and equal
in the two firms.
they choose.

One good, only, is produced.

Partners can contribute as many or as few labor hours as
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3.

The hiring partnership has the option of hiring as many employees (or hours)
as it desires at a given wage rate well below the dividend rate for
partners.

4.

Ail partners and hired employees in the two firms are identical except for
their relative preferences for income and leisure, these preferences being
distributed in the same manner over workers in the two firms.

Quality of

work ("effort") is held constant.
5.

The hiring partnership is always at the optimal aggregate labor utilization
(hiring) point.

6.

The firms own their own facilities and capital, which is equal in quantity
and quality between the two firms.

7.

Both firms are price-takers.

There is complete certainty.

Symbols:
y.1

income of the ith partner or employee

p

product price

n

number of partne.r s in each finn

m·1

number of work hours contributed by the ith partner

h.1

number of work hours contributed by the ith hired employee
total work hours contributed by partners
total work hours contributed by hired employees in the hiring partnership
total work hours contributed in a firm
partnership, L2

(in the non-hiring

= 0)

L*

optimal aggregate hours utilized in hiring partnership

F(L)

production function

w

market wage rate

m.

number of labor hours contributed by the jth partner

k

scale factor

J
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r

degrees of homogeneity of production function

R

fixed rental charge

tl

percentage tax on gross value of product

t2
Ui

percentage tax on net income of partnership
utility function of ith partner or employee

H

total number of hours available for individual partner or employee
to divide between working and leisure

y

a parameter representing m., h., n, k, p, Rs w, t , or t ;
l
,1
.1
2
used for convenience in mathematical manipulation.

Oefi ni ti ons:
Optimal Aggregate Labor Utilization:
or F'{L*}

L*

= L such

that pF' (L*)

= w,

= w/p. With the assumption that the hiring partnership is

always at the optimal aggregate labor utilization point, L2

= L* - Ll ,

and the following derivatives are defined:
(3_. 1)

3L 2 - 1 312 - 1 3L* - 0
3L 1 - - , ~ - , ' 3L 1 - •

Collective Partnership:

a partnership in which a partner's share in

net income is detenmined solely by the amount of work he contributes relative
to the total for the partners as a group.

Then, with no rent or tax payments,

m.

(3.2)

Yi = ~F(Ll).

Collective Hiring Partnership:

a partnership in which a member's share is

determined the same way as in a collective partnership, but in which non-partners
are hired at a low, given wage in such numbers as maximize the dividend per partner.
Then, with no rent or tax payments, income to a partner is given by
Ill.

= __1 pF(L*) - wl*
Ll

+ \~.,
1
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and the income of a hired employee is
(3.4)

y

= wh i .

It is clear from a comparison of (3.3) and (3.4) that, other things equal,
income to a partner is higher than income to an employee on a collective hiring
partnership if the wage rate is less that the maximum value of the average product
of labor.

It is also clear from the process of dividend maximization discussed

in section II that, other things equal, income to a partner is higher in the
collective hiring partnership than in the non-hiring partnership.
Incentives
As discussed above, the measure of work incentives used in this model is
the "marginal income"; the change in the income of an employee or partner due to
his contribution of an additional unit of work, other things equal:
In the collective partnership, from (3.2),

which

is

a convex combination of the values of the marginal and average

products of labor, less than VMP L when average product is rising, and
greater than VMP L when average product is falling.
From (3.3), for partners ~ in ·. tbe collective hiring partnership,
J

dy.

(3.6)

m. 1

- ' = (1 - ~)-L[pF(L*) - wL*] + w
ami
L1 1

=

m.
m.
r:w
+ (1 - ~)i:!PF(L*) - wL 2],
1

1

1

1

which is a convex combination of the wage rate and the net value of the
average product of labor (dividend rate) . .
For hired employees of the partnership, we find from (3.4):
dYe

(3.7)

~
1

= w = F'{L*).
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It is obvious from (3.6) and (3.7) that work incentives for partners in
the hiring partnership are larger, other things equal, than for hired employees.
From (3.5) and (3.7), it can be demonstrated that partners in the non-hiring
partnership also have higher work incentives, other things equal, than do hired
employees in the hiring partnership, at least in the range of declining average

,

product for Ll . To verify this, note that pF'(L*) s pF'(L,) < ~F{L,) for Ll s L*
in that range. If Ll is in the range of increasing avcrn~c ,ro ~uct, incent~vcs
for hired workers in the hiring partnership may be larger than those for nonhiring partners if the wage rate is greater than the value of the average product
of labor.
It

is not obvious from (3.5) and (3.6) which partnership offers the greater

work incentive.

For values of Ll less than L*, the first term in the non-hiring

partnership incentive equation is larger than the corresponding term in the hiring
partnership incentive equation, i.e., .pF1(L) is greater than w; but the situation
is reversed for the second term, i.e., pF1(ll) is less than pF1(L*) - wL 2. It is
likely~ however, that for at least some range of Ll less than L*, incentives in
the hiring partnership exceed those in the non-hiring firm.

It can be shown that

as a function of Ll , (3.5) increases, reaches a maximum, then decreases.
equation (3.6), however, marginal income is a decreasing function of l2'
incentives are equal · when Ll

= L*,

In
Since

it appears plausible that incentives for

partners in hiring partnerships are greater than those for non-hiring partners
for l, less than L*, or for some range of l, less than l2' where L2 is less than L*.
Interdependent Incomes
An interesting characteristic of producer cooperatives which seldom appears
in capitalist labor markets is the interdependence between one individual's work
decision and another man1s income and incentives.

For example, in the collective

partnership, the effect on the ith partner's income of an additional unit of work

19

contributed by partner

j

is given by

oy.
m. 1
(3.8) - ' = - _1[_ pF(L ) - pF'(L )]
l
omj
Ll Ll
1
t on th'
.
'
an d th e 1mpac
e 1th pilrl.ner s 1ncen t·,ves 1S
.L.

,.

The corresponding equations for the collective hiring partnership's partners
are
(3. 10)

oYi - _ ~_l (pF(L*) - \'lL ) - w]
2
omj - L1 L1

=-

m.
~[PF(L*) - wL*],
Ll

and
"'2y.
a
(3.11) ~~1_

omjom i

' m·
'1
[(2' -1 ) (.!JpF(l*) - wL 2] - w)]
L1
1
Ll~

1
= -L

1

m.

=:1 [(2r7 - l)(pF{l*) - wL*)].
II

1

From equations (3.8) and (3.10) we see that, other things equal, an additional
hour worked by a partner in the non-hiring partnership makes all the other partners
better off, in terms of income, when average product is rising, but makes everyone
else worse off when average product is falling (the normal production range);
while an additional hour worked by a partner in the hiring partnership always
reduces all other partners' incomes.

An additional hour contributed by a hiring

partner also reduces incentives for all other partners, provided that Ll is greater
than 2m i , as can be deduced from (3.11). With Ll greater than 2m i , (3.9) shows
that an increase in work performed by one partner in the non-hiring partnership

2Q

will reduce incentives for other partners in the declining-average-product range,
but will increase incentives for others for part of the range of increasing
average product of labor.
It should be clear that increases in the number of partners (n) in the
two organizations will have the same impacts on incomes and incentives of other
partners as increases in mj . As can be seen from equations (3.4) and (3.7),
changes in hj have no impact on income or incentives of the ith hired employee
in the hiring partnership.
The interdependence between one partner's

wor~

and other partners' incomes

evident in both hiring and non-hiring partnerships of the collective type may be
expected to cause jealousy, dissention, and inefficient labor-leisure decisions
as individuals attempt to prevent their income shares from eroding. Pressures
to set maximum allowable working hours might develop under these circumstances.
Income, Incentives, and Changes in Parameters
The impact on income and incentives of changes in firm scale, prices,
wages, -rent, and taxes can easily be determined.
Scale effects. If all factors of production are allowed . to. vary by
a scale factor, k, and the production function is homogeneous in the
relevant range, it can be denoted by F(kL), where F(kL)
F'(kL)

= Fr-JF'(L),

with r being the degree of homogeneity.

of a change in scale on a unn-hiring partner's

(3. 12)

aYi

ak

=

m. kr-2

a

ar

=

(3.13)

ay.1

ak

a
=

(r - 1) \

1

m.k r-2
= (r - 1) 'L pF(L*)
1

>

<

pF(ll) ~ 0 as r ~ 1.

the scale effect on income

m.

al([ki:-{PF(kL*) - wkL*) +

The effect

income is given by

For a partner in a hiring partnership,
is

= krF(L), and

\'lll1

i

J

0 as r

>

<

1.
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A change in scale affects incentives for non-hiring partners in the
following way:

which is positive when r

~

1 and average product is declining, and

positive everywhere if r

~

2.

For partners in hir1ng partnerships,

= (r - 'l)k r which is positive if r ' <1.
(r

2

m. 1
m.
1
(1 - KI:-.)~F(L*) + ~kr- DF(L*) - \-IL*],
1 L,
k L1

Note that with constant returns to scale

= 1), (3.l3) has a value of zero and (3.15) is positive. Hence, if

two identical

~ollective

hiring firms

were to be combined, increases

in incentives for all members would result, without
partner's ' income.

Po.

~

reduction in any

change in the scale of a . hiring finn

will not

affect the income or incentives of hired workers.
Income and incentives of non-hiring partners

Product price.

are affected by a change in product price in the fo11owin9 manner:
(3.16)

dYi

m.

ap = r4"{L 1) ,
1

22

r.li)k(L).

(3.17)

L1

L

1'

For partners in the hiring partnership, the corresponding effects are:

m.

dy.

(3. 18)

ap' = ~(L*)t
1

and

(3. 19)

All four of these derivatives are positive.

The price effect on individual

partner income is larger in the hiring partnership than in the non-hiring
partnership for Ll less than L*.

Other things equal, changes in product

price will affect neither income nor incentives of employees hired by the
partnership.
Wage rate.

A change in the market wage 'rate affects income and incen-

tives hired employees and partners in the hiring partnership.
For the hired employee,

(3.20)
(3.21)

,ay;

= hit
a2y.

d\'/

,

d\-Idh;

1,

=

and for the partner,

(3.22)

(3.23)

,aYi

ml

i 2
aw- = -11=

,a2Y i
aW(}m
i

,

' 'L*
1

m.(l--)
,
L'

m.
=

I1-

(1

m L2

i
- -)-=
Ll L1

1 - (1 -

m l*

i
r-)r.

1

1

AD expected, wage increases raise the income and incentives

employee, and lower the income of the partner.

o~

the hired

The impact of a wage
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; ncrease on the ; ncenti ve of a partner wi 11 be negati ve, provi ded tha t
L,

m.

L* < (1 -

i-).
1

Rent.
partner

If rent (R) ;s paid by the two firms, income to the ith

becomes, from {3.2} and (3.3),

m.
(3.2a) Yi = i-[PF(L 1} - RJ
1

in the non-hiring partnership, and in the hiring partnership,

m.

(3.3a) Yi = r:rPF(L*) - wL* - R] + wm i .
1

Changes in rent have the same income and incentive effects on
partners in both non-hiring and hiring partnerships:

(3.24)

oy.1

mr=

m.1

-Il

a2 y.1 .
(3.25) aRam = i

1

-(1
L1

.m.

__
1)

L •
1

Both derivatives are negative.

Changes in rent do not affect income or

i ncent ; ves of the hi red ,e mployees.
Output tax.

The imposition of a tax (t,) on the value of gross

output changes partner income to

in the non-hiring partnership, and
m·

(3.3b) Yi

= ~(l - t1)pF(L*) - wL*]

+ \~i

in the hiring partnership.
The effects on income and incentives of a change in t, are given by
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(3.26)

and

ay.
m.
1
~F(L,)
at, -

,

a 2 y.

(3.27)

1

-

at, am; -

m.
m. ,
[~F' (L,) + (' - ~)r-PF(L,)]

,

,

1

for partners in the non7hiring partnership, and by
ay.

m.

(3.28) dt~ = - ~F(L*}
and

(3.29)
for partners. in the hiring firm.

. All four derivatives are negative.

Hired workers' incentives and incomes are unaffected by the tax.
A tax (t 2) on net finm income (before dividend payments)
leaves individual partnerswith incomes of
Income tax.

and

in

th~

non-hiring and hiring

~a~

firms, . respectively.

As t2 changes,

incomes) and i ncenti ves for p~rtners change in the fo 11 owi ng ways:
In the non-hiring partnership,

ay.1
m.
(3.30) at = - ~F(L1)'
2
,
(3.31)

In the hiring partnership,
m.

ay.
(3.32)

_1

at 2

= -

_1

L,

[pF(L*) - wL 2J,
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(3.33)

Again, all four derivatives are negative.

In the absence of rent, the

income and output taxes have identical effects on the
~hip,

but not Qn the hiring partnership.

non-hiring partner-

A tax on net firm income does

not affect employees.

Impact on Hours Worked
The income and

inc~ntive

effects of changes in various parameters

derived above are useful in helping to detenmine the impact of those
changes on individual labor-leisure decisions.
Assume the uti 1i ty functi on of the i th p.a rtner or. employee is 'of
i
the form U = Ui(Yi' H - mil [or Ui = Ui(Yi' H - hi)]' where H is the
total number of ho'urs ava;-lable to divide between working and leisure,
and Yi is a function of mi (or hi) and a parameter y, which is used as a
proxy for anyone of the parameters mo, h ., n, k, p, W, R, t 1 , t 2• The
J
J
first-order conditions for utility maximization require that

. ay

(3.34)

q'

0

•

= 0,

U1' ·- , - \..:2
ar.l i

J

where u~ is the marginal utility of income for the ith individual and

u~ is the marginal utility of leisure. Differentiating (3.34) totally
. din.

with respect to mi and

and solving for ~Yie1dS
2 '.
. d Yo
ay. av..
.

,,1

1

.~ 1 aya m, + dy

dm.

(3.35)

y

0

<Fi- =
.i

ay.
2

U, :--r-1 +
am .
1

' ( - ' U'

am 1.

uil1

~

(~Yi

3m.

1

1)
~

i

- u21

11 -

UI')

21
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Since equation (3.35) represents the change in the utility-maximizing
amount of labor contributed by the ith partner in the non-hiring or hiring partnership,

the sign of the derivative is of considerable interest.

The corresponding equation for the hired worker is obtained by replacing
mi with hi in (3.35).
A sufficient condition for the denominator of (3.35) to be negative,

a2y.
i
assuming that U is strictly concave, is ~ s O. In the non-hiring partam.1

nership,

(3.36)

a 2 y . . m.

= ~Pl(l

1

~

Ll'

1

) + 2(

1

II 0- m.
1
'1
l)[pF'(l) - r--pF(ll)]'
l1
Ll ;
1

which is negative when average product of labor is at its maximum or
falling.
In the hiring

partner~hip,

and
a 2 y.

(3.38) ~
aha1

= o.
aye

aye

The sign of the numerator of (3.35) depends upon om~' ay~.' and
1

1

a 2 y.

aya~i' all of which have been determined above, and upon u~, U~l' and

U~l.

If we make the usual assumptions u~

>

0, U~l

<

0, and U~l ~ 0,
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dm.

the sign of

ay 1

dh.

or

ay 1

can be determined, though in some cases additional

assumptions are needed.
Table 3 summarizes the effects of changes in various parameters on
incomes, incentives, and hours worked by partners in collective hiring
partnerships, collective partnerships, communal partnerships, and by emp10yees of collective hiring partnerships.

The results for communal partnerships

and for employees of collective hiring partnerships are based on those derived
for communes and for capitalist workers in Israelsen [1980a].

In communal

partnerships, it is assumed that each partner receives an equal share,
though the results are qualitatively the same as long as shares are not
determined by work contributed to the partnership.

For a communal partner-

ship, a partner's income is given by
(3.39)

Yi =

*

F(L)f

and the work incentive is
(3.40)

aYi
al.
1

1

= it

F' (l), where o£ represents labor contribution.

As can be seen, work incentives are much lower in a communal partnership than
in collective partnerships, with or without hiring, as the partner in the
communal partnership receives only lin
income.

th

of his marginal product as marginal

Recall that the collective partner marginal incomes are greater than

marginal product in the normal production range.

For a partner in a communal

partnership, it doesn't matter who does the work, as is shown in equation
(3.41), the impact on partner i's income of additional work contributed by
partner j.
(3.41)
Note that the derivative has the same value as in (3.40).

Hence, we might

expect that hours contributed by communal partners would be fewer than those
contributed by collective partners, other things equal.

We might also expect

TABLE 3
The Effect of Changes in Various Parameters on Incomes, Incentives,
and Hours Worked by the i
Effect on Income
Nature
of
Change

.a

Partner or Hired Worker*

+

Hiring Collective Communal Hired
Firm
Firm
Firm
Worker
Partner
Partner Partner

a

0

a

a

Ob

Ob

Ob

0

+b

+a,b

Increase
in p

+

+

+

0

+

+

Increase
in R

h

For r = 1.
c RRA = 1.

d

(U

i

21 > 0,

~

b

Hiring Collective Communal Hired
Firm
Firm
Firm
Worker
Partner
Partner Partner

0

+c

+a,c

a

0

+c

+a,c

a,c

0

+b

+a,h

_a,h

c

+

0

o

0

+c

0

0

+c

0

0

0

Increase
in tl
Increase
in t2

_a

a

0

Increase
in k

i
i
0
;
*Assuming U, > 0, U'l < 'U 21
a
In the range of declining APL •

Effect on Hours Worked

Effect on Incentives

Hiring . Collective Communal Hired
Fi~
Firm
- Firm
Worker
Partner . Pa~tner
Partner

Increase
in mj
or h
j
Increase
in n

th

0
0

0

C_,O)a,c,dC_,O)a,c,d 0
+a,c

+a

0

(+,O)a,c,d(+,O)a,c,d 0

(+,O)c,d (+,O)a,c,d(+,O)a,c,d 0

o.
N

ex>

U

i

21

= e).
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pressure to set required minimum contributions in communal partnerships.
For employees of the hiring partnership, income is

(3.42)

y. = wi-i ,
1 .

and incentiven are
dYe
1
-=
(3.43)
dR..

w = F'(L).

1

The impact of additional work contributed by partners or other employees
on the income and incentives of a given employee is zero.
Superscripts attached to signs in table 3 refer to assumptions
sufficient to obtain the reported sign.

One particularly useful assumption

suggested by Arrow [1971] is that " re1ative risk aversion," defined as

(3.44)

RRA

is close to unity.
It is clear from the table that hiring employees makes little difference in the impact on income, incentives, or hours worked in collective
partnerships, at least in terms of the direction of change.

With only

minor qualifications, impacts are always in the same direction for partners
in hiring and non-hiring partnerships.

The major difference in the two

cases is that the impacts shown are more certain for hiring partnerships
than for non-hiring partnerships.

There are tremendous differences,

however among collective partnerships, communal partnerships, and employees.
None of the parameter changes examined had any effect on income, incentives,
or hours worked by employees, while the impact on communal partners was
opposite that on collective partners in about half of the cases.
ticular interest are the impacts on hours worked.

Of par-

For increases in work

contributed by others (m.), increases in partnership size (n), and
J

increases in scale of operation (k), partners in collective firms respond
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by increasing their individual contributions, while partners in communal firms
cut back on the amount of work contributed.

When combined with the findings

from section II, the results summarized in table 3 allow us to come to some
conclusions about law firms as economic organizations, and to offer some
conjectures about recent trends in the
IV.

Summarl~

u.s.

legal profession.

Conclusions, and Speculations

What can be concluded about the law firm as an economic organization?
Our final observations are grouped into comments on labor utilization efficiency;
individual income, incentives, and hours worked; problems related to the foregoing categories in law firms of different types, as suggested by the theory
and as evidenced by recent trends and concerns in the legal profession; and,
finally, suggestions for further research.
Rankings
Labor-use _efficienfY. In the model of section II, with number of partners
fixed in the short run, but variable in the long run; with the number of
hours contributed by partners or employees fixed; and with the quantity and
quality of work performed the same for all, only partnerships (or simple firms)
able to hire associates or paralegals will be efficient in the short run.

In

the long run, optimal partnership size entails total labor use efficiency for
hiring firms, while partnerships without hiring maximize income per partner
at an inefficiently low level of labor utilization as long as wage rates for
legal work are less than partnership dividends.

In terms of number of partners,

the optimal number for a partnership with hiring will always be less than that
of a partnership without hiring.

As shown in figure 2, the optimal number of

partners in the non-hiring firm is found at (L ), where VMPL = VAP •
3
L

For the

hiring partnership, D is a decreasing function of Ll as long as w is less than
than VAP

L

at the total labor utilization point.

Hence, with optimization, L!
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equals one unless w is greater than or equal to maximum VAP •
L
In addition to utilizing an inefficiently small amount of labor, the
non-hiring partnership shows "perverse" labor utilization and output adjustments in response to changes in product price, rent, and tax on gross output
value.

Hiring partnerships show the same economically-efficient adjustment

as do competitive capitalist firms.
Income.

These differences are shown in table 2.

With labor hours fixed for partners and employees, income of

partners in hiring firms will be higher than income of partners in non-hiring
firms if w is less than VAP , other . things equal, ··as illustrated in figure 1.
L
With optimization, income to a hiring partner will exceed that to a nonhiring partner unless w is greater than or equal to maximum VAP , as seen
L
in figure 2.

Since the income of employees of the hiring partnership will

be equal to VMP , it will be less than that of partners as long as w is less
L
than maximum VAP L • In general, then, partners in hiring firms will enjoy the
largest incomes, with incomes of partners in non-hiring firms being second,
and _incomes of employees .being smallest, as long as w is less than VAP , and
L
the hiring partnership is employing the optimal amount of aggregate labor.
If optimization of partnership size is allowed, the differences in incomes
among the three groups are increased.

Allowing for flexibility in hours

contributed magnifies the differences even more.

With a given number of

partners in the firm, incentives to work for partners exceed those for hired
workers in both hiring and non-hiring partnerships.

In addition, it seems

likely that incentives for partners in hiring firms exceed those of partners
in non-hiring firms.

This raises the possibility that partners will work

more hours than employees, other things equal, and that hiring partners will
work more hours than will non-hiring partners.
will be even larger with variable work hours.

If so, income differentials
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Incentives.

In the normal production region, work incentive is likely

greatest for a partner in a collective hiring partnership, followed by those
for a partner in a collective partnership, for an employee, and for a partner
in a communal partnership, respectively.
Hours worked.

Other things equal, hours worked will probably be smallest

for a communal partner, with those for an employee, a collective partner, and
a collective hiring partner increasing in order.

In terms of efficiency, only

the employee will work the socially-efficient number of hours.

Hours worked

by communal partners will be inefficiently small, and those worked by collective
partners and collective hiring partners will be inefficiently large. With a
given number of

partnexs~

communal and cOllective partnerships may ·show

"}>erverse" output responses to changes in product price, and will respond in
socially inefficient ways to changes in rent, as shown in table 3.
Implications
The theory developed in this work suggests that problems of various
types are likely to beset law firms.

Collective partnerships and communal

partnerships may not be operating with the economically efficient capitallabor ratios, underutilizing labor, hence increasing production costs and
creating deadweight losses for society.
culty is' to utilize hired employees.

An obvious way out of this diffi-

At the level of the individual, the

theory suggests that communal partnerships will have difficulty inducing
partners to work enough hours, while collective partnerships, with or without
hiring, will be faced with excessive hours worked by partners, and by internal
dissention, jealously, and breakdown of morale.

Casual observation suggests

that average hours contributed, as well as the partnership standard, are greater
for collective partnerships than for communal partnerships.

Increases in firm

size in recent years has been accompanied by increases in average hours worked
in collective partnerships, as predicted by the theory.

This is evidenced
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by widespread concern in the profession over the problem of "burnout."
Problems related to the difficulty of operating a system of determining
income shares without spending an excessive amount of partner time,
creating ill will among partners, and generally destroying cohesion within
the partnership are well recognized in the legal profession, and have led
to an ongoing dialogue on the matter within the profession as well as to
a lucrative opportunity for management consultants and facilitators (see,
for example, Knotter [1991]).
How might these incentive problems be resolved?

One way would be

moving to simple firms, especially sole practitioners, who utilize hired
paralegals and associates.

If the sole practitioner specializes in one

area of the law, he can capture gains from specialization, and by hiring
employees, also operate at the efficient labor utilization point and can
take advantage of economies of size and scale.
attractive in a large market for legal services.
sol~

This option would be most
Perhaps most important,

practitioners avoid the w.ork incentive problems that drag down income

in communal partnerships and create dissention and burnout in collective
partnerships.

There is another way.

Because the incentive problems are

caused by interdependent incomes, the problems can be attacked by a strategy
designed to create interdependencies in utility functions.
•

J

•
If my partners

well-being makes me feel better, I will work more hours in a communal partnership and fewer hours in a collective partnership than if I am concerned only
about my own income and leisure.

In fact, if each of my partner's income

and leisure affects my utility function in the same manner as my own income
and leisure, I will work the economically efficient number of hours regardless
of the type of income determination scheme within the partnership.

To the

extent that this strategy could be utilized, it would seem to be less difficult
the smaller the partnership.
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Speculations.

Given the implications discussed above, it would

seem that the future looks brightest for collective partnerships which hire
labor, and for sole practitioners who specialize and hire labor.
for communal partnerships is bleak.

The outlook

Unless these organizations can find a way

to increase incentives and income--perhaps by hiring employees and working on
esprit de corps--they will have difficulty competing with the more productive
alternatives.
Future Research.

This line of research could go in a number of directions.

The inclusion in the model of more factors, such as labor specialization,
multiple products, uncertainty, and interdependent utility functions is one
direction which should prove fruitful.

Another is empirical testing of the

hypotheses, including a survey of lawyers to identify the relationships among
type of firm, size of firm, impacts of income share determination method on
incentives and cohesion, and expected future trends in the profession.

* The author is Associate Professor of Economics at Utah State University,
Logan, Utah. He is indebted to a number of attorneys with whom he has
discussed this project, especially to Ned Israelsen of Escondido, California,
and Gary Anderson of Logan, Utah.
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